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1Knowledge sharing and cultural distance
A widespread belief among both managers and management researchers is that the process
of identifying, capturing and leveraging knowledge, know-how and best practices inside
organisations contributes substantially to creating their competitive advantages (Leonard 1995,
O’Dell & Grayson 1998, von Krog 1998). Especially this is true today, because the speed of
competition is continuously increasing (Hedlund 1994). By sharing knowledge between its
members, an organisation avoids redundancy in the knowledge production, secures diffusion of best
practice and enables problem solving by making relevant personal knowledge available to the
problem-solving process regardless where it is obtained and stored originally in the organisation.
Moreover, knowledge sharing contributes to knowledge creation which is a social process involving
sharing tacit knowledge and converting part of the tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge (Nonaka
& Takeuchi 1995). Knowledge is created by individuals, but is also expressed in regularities by
which members co-operate in a social community: “What firms do better than markets is the
sharing and transfer of the knowledge of the individuals and groups within an organisation“ (Kogut
& Zander 1992: 383).
Knowledge sharing raises issues that are relevant for the competitiveness of the company
for the present, whereas other aspects of knowledge management, such as experimentation and
access to external knowledge to a higher degree address the future competitiveness of the company.
At the same time, managers increasingly realise that organisations possess rich resources of
unknown and non-exploited knowledge in the form of know-how, best practices and specific
knowledge. Making this body of personal knowledge available to others is a central activity in the
knowledge creating company (Nonaka 1994). However, although it may sound simple, sharing
knowledge in an organisation is far from being a smooth and self-propelled process. The challenges
are related to the knowledge transmitter, the knowledge receiver and to the very process of
transferring knowledge.
This paper focuses on a number of specific features of knowledge sharing in the context of
Russian companies with foreign participation. It argues that some of the general problems and
difficulties in sharing knowledge are reinforced and perpetuated in the Russian business and
organisational culture. When foreign companies buy shares of or take over companies in Russia,
their first and foremost concern addresses productivity and efficiency issues in the respective
Russian organisation. In order to increase the competitiveness of the Russian company on the
domestic market and internationally, it is necessary to focus on the ability of the organisation to
adapt to the ever changing market conditions. One way to deal with this complex task is to focus on
the capacity of the organisation to develop and exploit the available internal knowledge resources
and to receive and implement knowledge from foreign companies. The specific benefits for foreign
owned companies in Russia by knowledge sharing are speeding up the change process while
educating local employees and securing diffusion of knowledge further into the organisation. In
order to be successful, however, western owners, managers and expatriates should be conscious of
the impediments in knowledge sharing in Russian companies and gain insights about how to
organise individual learning processes.
Culture and cultural characteristics constitute a key determinant of managerial practices
(Neghandi & Prasad 1971) and have, consequently, a significant impact on the process of
knowledge transfer within and among organisations. We assume that significant differences
between cultures do exist (Griffeth et al. 1980) and do indeed make a difference, often a substantial
difference in the way that managers and employees behave in organised settings (Steers et al. 1992).
Cultural characteristics belong to a set of factors that are of a more fundamental, pervasive nature in
their capacity to induce valences for a broad variety of domains (Wilpert &  Scharpf 1990: 651).
For the purpose of the present paper, we adopt the view of culture as a shared system of
representations and meaning (Goodenough 1971, Geertz 1983) that is learned and used by people to
interpret experience and to generate social behaviour (Terpstra & David 1991, Hodgetts & Luthans
1991). This theoretical choice implies that culture is not necessarily associated with the whole of a
particular society, but is approached in a dynamic way as being related to certain sets of activities
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important when dealing with Russia, the country with the largest territory in the world.
Four key factors need to be especially considered when focusing on knowledge sharing in
Russian companies with foreign participation.
First, the business contacts between Russia and the West are in general not characterised by
rich traditions and a long history. The countries of the former Soviet Union and the western world
were rather isolated from each other and there were no strong and frequent contacts at the enterprise
level. In Boyacigiller’s (1990) framework, one could expect that this leads to an increased cultural
distance between Russia and the West. As argued by Lei and Slocum (1992), the lack of experience
of collaborating with the partner causes major difficulties in the development of the alliance.
Second, in the context of the present study, the knowledge providers and the knowledge
seekers are not merely people from different cultures having different patterns of lifestyles, beliefs,
values, views, expectations and codes of behaviour. The cultural distance is higher in this context
since the two groups, in our case westerners and Russians, both playing both roles, represent very
different ideological, religious and social backgrounds as well. This implies an even larger psychic
distance (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, O’Grady & Lane 1996) including differences in legal and
structural systems and in the degree of industrial development along with the differences in
nationality. In that sense, it is worth bearing in mind that the cultures of some countries prove to be
more problematic for individuals of specific national origins to adapt to (McDonald & Pak, 1996:
11).
Third, language plays a significant role in the knowledge sharing process. Its importance
becomes even more critical in cross-cultural settings when the partners’ native languages differ
from each other: in that case ambiguity increases substantially. As pointed out by Simonin (1999:
472-473), “the lack of fluency in a partner’s native language may constitute the single greatest
obstacle since even well codified knowledge remains inaccessible”. The behavioural transparency
in such cases gets limited in the sense of reduced extent to which partners understand each other’s
behaviour. This is the core of communication difficulties and misunderstandings in multicultural
settings (Adler & Graham 1989) and affects the processes of learning and knowledge sharing
heavily.
Forth, Russian culture is generally considered to be a collectivist culture (Smith 1990,
Bollinger 1994, Garrison & Artemyev 1994), although there are recent indications of increasing
individualism (Veiga et al. 1995). People in collectivist cultures have generally greater difficulties
in dealing with outsiders (Triandis et al. 1988) and that potentially increases the challenges in the
process of knowledge sharing in Russian companies with foreign participation.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the question we address in the present paper is: What
are the specific features of knowledge sharing in Russian companies with foreign participation?
The field and the study
Empirically, we draw on the examples of two Russian companies with Danish participation
in which we have conducted fieldwork during 1999.
Company A operates in the construction industry and is fully owned by a Danish
multinational firm. The Russian subsidiary employs approximately five hundred people and has a
Danish management team. Company B operates in the telecommunication industry and is partly
owned (with a minority of shares) by a Danish company and partly by Russian shareholders. B
employs seventy five people and at present, its management is entirely Russian. Both organisations
are situated in large Russian cities in the European part of the country. The two Danish parent
companies have a rich international experience. However, they differ in terms of having concrete
experiences in Russia - while company A is the result of a very fresh Danish investment (about a
year), the Danish investor who bought shares in company B has been involved on the Russian
market for decades.
The data used in this paper were primarily generated through face-to-face open-ended
interviews with both Russian and Danish managers in the two subsidiaries. Observations and
informal conversations constituted an important part of the data collection process. In company B
3which at present has no Danish representative in the management team, we conducted interviews
with Danish managers in the parent company. We also used our insights from a three-year
management training project that has taken place in Russia in the period 1997-1999 and where one
of us has been intensively involved in conducting and managing the programme. In the framework
of this project Russian top and middle managers whose companies are subsidiaries, suppliers or
customers of Nordic firms went through a one-year management education and training.
Our qualitative sampling promotes the quality of data as the major concern and relegates
representativeness to secondary importance (Gummesson 1991). We conduct “analytic
generalisations”, not “statistical” ones (Yin 1994); in epistemological terms, we opt for “logical
inference” rather than for “statistical inference” (Smith 1991). In the process of generating field
data, “thick description” emerged, description that involves “guessing at meanings, assessing the
guesses and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses (Geertz 1973: 20). It is
important for us to understand the phenomenon of knowledge sharing in its particular context, e.g.
Russian firms with foreign participation. We let the reader hear some of the respondents’ voices by
quoting them in the analysis.
Basic problems in knowledge sharing
The knowledge management literature often postulates that tacit knowledge is the opposite
of explicit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, Leonard 1995, Choi & Lee 1997, Kogut &
Zander 1993). However, in line with Polanyi’s (1966) work, we assume that all kind of knowledge
includes a tacit dimension associated with the fact that “we can know more than we can tell”. In one
end of the spectrum, knowledge is almost completely tacit: it is stored semiconsciously and
unconsciously in peoples brains and neural systems and it is uniquely personal and complex (Cole
1998, Leonard & Sensiper 1998). In the other end of the spectrum, knowledge is predominantly
explicit and codified and thus easier accessible to other people (e.g. blueprints, description of best
practice, manuals). According to Zander (1991) and Szulanski (1996), tacit knowledge is more
difficult to share and transfer than the more articulated knowledge. Between the two poles,
knowledge is partly explicit or articulated and partly tacit, and applying explicit knowledge requires
mastery of the associated tacit knowledge. Some authors believe that all tacit knowledge in
principle can be articulated (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, Spender 1996) as long as the organisation is
willing to bear the costs of doing it. However, in reality tacit knowledge is not only shared by
articulation but also in a tacit form. Tacit knowledge can mainly be acquired through
experimentation, learning by doing and imitating the skills of superior performers within an area.
When knowledge is created, it has an implicit character in the sense that it takes a not-
articulated form. In order to share and subsequently leverage the knowledge, one can choose to
transfer it in a purely implicit form. In that case, knowledge sharing relies on costly and slow
methods like imitation and personal transfer and apprenticeship (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). An
alternative is to articulate and codify the knowledge e.g. as best practices, manuals, metaphors,
cause-effect relations and other kinds of documentation. The benefit of investing in codification and
hereby to some extent detaching specific knowledge from individuals is easier and quicker to
leverage across time, distance and users. This process of transforming knowledge from an implicit
to an explicit state in order to transfer it and vice versa in order to receive it, is not free of cost for
the transmitter nor the receiver (Grant 1996, Jensen & Meckling 1996).
Knowledge sharing initiatives encounter the risk of eroding rather than enhancing
competitive advantages (Winter 1987). The codification of knowledge for transfer increases the risk
of this knowledge being spread further to competing companies e.g. because it is easier for the
individual employee to bring away bundles of knowledge and not only the fragmented knowledge
he may possess himself. In other words, knowledge sharing initiatives can be a double edge sword
to the company. On the one side, codified and articulated knowledge is easier and less costly to
replicate and leverage internally. On the other side, once knowledge is articulated, the risk of
imitation outside the company increases dramatically (Mahnke 1999, Szulanski 1996). Szulanski’s
(1996) systematic empirical investigation of the barriers of transferring best practice inside the
company indicates that voluntary and involuntary knowledge sharing needs not to be a tightly
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characteristics of the situation, the prospective imitator needs to surmount other barriers to imitation
even after having unlocked the secrets of superior knowledge.
Besides the difficulties associated with sharing different types of knowledge, there are
problems related to knowledge transmitters and knowledge receivers. Unawareness in both ends of
the transfer is a major barrier to knowledge sharing (Szulanski 1996). Potential users/receivers are
often not aware of the existence of the knowledge they need and likewise, the potential sources are
not aware that there may be use for their knowledge somewhere else in the organisation. The larger
organisation the larger is the problem of unawareness. As pointed out by the information cost
perspective (Grant 1996, Jensen & Meckling 1996), the solution to the problem of unawareness is
not to share all knowledge created in organisation but to strive for transferring only the relevant
pieces of knowledge. However, the necessary condition to achieve this is knowing in advance what
specific knowledge is relevant and to whom.
Knowledge sharing involves uncertainty in respect to what specific piece of idiosyncratic
knowledge is to be shared with whom in order to create benefits for the organisation (Jensen &
Meckling 1996). Nonaka (1994) suggests that efficient knowledge sharing depends on the
willingness of individuals to signal to the organisation which knowledge they possess and to share
their knowledge when requested. Individuals and teams that have invested resources in building up
a specific competence may not be willing to share this knowledge with others unless they are given
the right incentives for doing it. When knowers signal what they know, receivers can decide which
specific piece of knowledge they need and acquire it from its owner. A precondition for this is that
the potential receiver first of all has, sufficient prior related knowledge to assess the value of the
new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal 1990) and secondly, does not resist using knowledge from
outsiders (Katz & Allen 1982).
Knowledge management in companies also takes a point of departure in projects aimed at
registering or mapping the knowledge stored in the individuals employed by the organisation. The
recent development in IT technology enables knowledge sharing by providing e.g. powerful and
user-friendly databases that facilitate knowledge identification and alerting. However, technology
alone is not the solution to knowledge transfer. As argued above, the most valuable knowledge
cannot or is too expensive to articulate which is obviously a precondition for sharing knowledge
electronically. Even if the initial ambitions are to capture all relevant individual knowledge, in
reality the registration has the form of a yellow page activity or internal electronic directories and
databases where the knowledge is identified by its position in the organisation, but not necessarily
moved from a personal domain to a shared domain.
The following sections elaborate on these problems in the Russian organisational context.
Russians as knowledge transmitters
Lack of incentives for sharing knowledge
A potential knowledge transmitter may choose to hoard his knowledge for two reasons.
First, he may fear loosing his value by sharing knowledge with other people. Second, besides
protecting competitive advantages, he may deter from sharing knowledge due to the cost involved.
The time spent on sharing knowledge with others cannot be invested in what may appear to be more
productive for the individual. Especially in an organisational structure that promotes individual
optimisation, the potential knowledge provider has little incentive to overcome the obstacle of time
and resources: he will naturally ask himself what he would gain from transferring the knowledge
compared with spending the time on activities strictly related to his own performance. Unless
knowledge sharing is built into the expectation of the individual and is reflected in the reward
mechanism, sharing will not take place.
Organisational structures and incentives may in some situations promote a tendency of units
and individuals to optimise their own rewards and accomplishments and, as a consequence,
consciously or unconsciously hide knowledge from other units and individuals (O’Dell & Grayson
1998). Thereby they sub-optimise the total organisation. Paradoxically, organisations in which
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individual hoarding knowledge from others in the organisation. “In organisations where expertise is
highly regarded, but mentoring and assisting others is not, rational people may be unlike to
surrender the power they gain from being an important knowledge source” (Leonard & Sensiper
1998: 123). For example, the tradition and culture of consulting companies rewarding individual
results in combination with a strong pressure for billing hours make it very difficult to convince
consultants that they should spend time on sharing knowledge beyond the limit of their own teams
(O’Dell & Grayson 1998: 164).
In our two case organisations, Russian managers and employees aim at accumulating
knowledge but not at sharing it. The data clearly suggest that knowledge is approached as an
important source of individual power rather than a corporate resource that can be shared:
“To tell you honestly, my primary goal is to develop the competencies of my own
department and prove to the others in the company that I am better than the others. We socialise
within the department, not across departments although the company is not big.” (Russian middle
manager, company B)
According to Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos (1990: 282), Russian managers “do not share
information with outsiders without a clear explicit instruction” and “they rarely volunteer
information”. This indicates that the Russian knowledge transmitter is not really willing to share his
knowledge even though the organisation has already invested resources in transforming the
knowledge into an explicit and easily transferable state, as e.g. information. The resistance to
sharing knowledge internally contradicts in a way the argument that Russian culture is a collectivist
one as claimed by Smith (1990), Bollinger (1994), Garrison & Artemyev (1994).
The Russians’ strong tendency of hoarding knowledge could be explained by a number of
reasons. Russians are especially concerned about protecting their individual competitive
advantages, since they believe that accumulating knowledge would support their position in the
organisation and their further carrier development. They signal / demonstrate in a number of ways
the fact that they, in one or another occasion, have acquired new knowledge. At the same time,
however, they are not willing to share the content of this new knowledge with others. To illustrate,
Russians make visible the diplomas they receive from attending courses, programs, etc. To others
by, for example, hanging them at the most visible places in their offices. At the same time, they
resist presenting part of the acquired knowledge at seminars, working meetings or other occasions
unless they are convinced that this might help them climbing the carrier latter. In the light of the
given example, it is to be noticed that receiving a diploma is an extremely strong incentive for
Russians, often stronger that the learning experiences and the acquired knowledge, for attending
and participating in a training programme or course.
Another explanation for not sharing knowledge is the experiences accumulated in the
socialist past. Following one of our respondents:
“Everybody in Russia was trained to keep things confidential.” (Western manager,
company A)
This preference not to share was perpetuated by the fear that transmitted information could
be misinterpreted, often deliberately, by both the immediate and the following receivers and this
would harm the transmitter. In a highly politicised organisational context, as the one in Russia
especially before 1991, such misinterpretations could have led to heavy consequences for the
transmitter and his network. In that case, the receiver would not have been negatively affected by
the misinterpretation: on the contrary, he would have been rewarded if able to “substantiate” the
ground of his interpretation. This is very different from a situation when the misinterpretation is
associated with the lack of prior knowledge on the receiver’s side. In the Russian context, the
receiver has a lot of knowledge, which he can deliberately apply in interpreting or misinterpreting
new knowledge.
Departmental way of thinking and acting
The single departments in a company possess partial knowledge and only by sharing it
across the departmental boundaries, the company can make use of the full body of their knowledge.
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single units are merely oriented towards their own tasks and goals without considering the company
as a whole. This strong departmentalisation in Russian organisations makes the application of well-
known techniques of sharing knowledge frequently applied in Denmark (and elsewhere in the West)
problematic in the Russian context.
One of the explanations of the merely departmental way of thinking and acting is that there
are a number of functions and positions that are replicated in terms of content but are positioned
differently in terms of department affiliation. Consequently, the employees are not interested in, and
moreover, are afraid of putting that issue forward since this would question and risk their
employment. Russian managers prefer as well not to dig into the problem since they are
preoccupied with the social and employment security dimension of their organisations rather than
with the economic efficiency of the company.
Again another interpretation of the narrow managerial focus was offered by a Russian
middle manager in company A:
“The heads of departments do not co-operate because they are overwhelmed by the tasks
given to them by the Danish management team and cannot simply find the time to interact. They
first take care of their own departments, but then there is no time left.”
Also other Russian respondents used the Danish management team’s working style as an
excuse rather than as a reasonable explanation for the lacking co-operation among people from
various units in company A. One should notice, however, that the lack of co-operation among
departments was a well expressed feature of organisational every-day life before the Danish
investor bought shares in company A, as mentioned by the respondents themselves. Although the
management group in company B is entirely Russian, the situation there does not differ essentially
from the one in company A: departments are merely focused on their own tasks and close co-
operation between them is missing.
According to Hansen (1999: 106), ”relations at the interpersonal level may substitute for or
complement relations at the inter-unit level (and vice versa)”. That might explain the set-up in the
Russian organisational context: there is no intensive interface between the single units, however, the
interpersonally based interaction is characterised by a high level of dynamics. A number of authors
highlight the importance of personal relationships and trust in the Russian context (Dabars &
Vokhmina 1995, Holden et al 1998, Ledeneva 1998, Kets de Vries 1998). So did our respondents:
“In Russia, one needs friends or friends of friends. Otherwise, one cannot do anything.”
(Western manager, company A).
 This could elucidate the fact that Russian managers and employees register the fact of
being strongly oriented towards their own department but do not perceive that as a problem. It must,
however, be kept in mind that by preventing the diffusion of knowledge across departmental
boundaries, for example the time of developing new products is slowed down considerably and the
generation of new cycles of learning does not take place.
Fear of admitting mistakes
Another specificity in the Russian organisational context is that sharing problems and
talking about mistakes are taboos. Moreover, they do not connect mistakes with a potential for
learning. One of the reasons is that they are much more focused on achieving a final result by
executing a task that has been formulated prior to their action(s). Russian managers and employees
confess that they are not interested in reflecting upon the process of decision-making and their
actions. The conviction “we are here to learn, not to discuss our problems” (Hibbert 1990) is widely
shared among Russian managers and employees and is among the factors inhibiting their capacity to
develop new knowledge. The belief that mistakes and problems are dubious and should be avoided
at any cost is deeply rooted in Russian organisational culture:
“Our slogan is ‘We do not have the right to make mistakes!’” (Russian middle manager,
company A)
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Russians explicitly claim that “if they act, they risk making mistakes, therefore, they prefer not to
act”.
Whereas Danish managers are ready to discuss problems openly and to give and receive
feedback, this seems to be rather confusing for the Russians who do not consider discussions
important and try to avoid them especially when they regard problems (Michailova & Anisimova
1999). A part from another interview in company A exemplifies this issue nicely:
Interviewers: Could you give us some examples of problems you have identified after you
have started working in company A? You are a newcomer and have,
therefore, this fresh look at the company…
Respondent: I cannot talk about problems, I have a boss.
Interviewers:We have the clearance from the management team that our respondents are
free to tell what they think.
Respondent: Yes, but you are asking about problems…
Interviewers:The Danish managers gave us several examples of problems they
encountered and of mistakes they made…
Respondent: They did…? I do not understand that. This is really peculiar.
The fact that failures are not viewed as learning opportunities and that talking about them is
a taboo is embedded in the “coercive bureaucracy” (Adler 1999) typical for the Russian
organisational structural context. This configuration is based on positional authority, top-down
command and control and autocratic strategy development. Our findings add two more features: the
lack of reflection and feedback. They both are important in the sense that they can significantly
increase the learning. The reflection issue is closely related to the feedback concern – an important
source of feedback is the outcome of the work itself. However, if managers are not able / willing to
reflect upon their own work processes, it is very likely that they will miss exploiting this feedback
source. And, in turn, the lack of feedback is a barrier for reflection.
Russian managers and employees’ negative attitude towards making and talking about
mistakes limits the possibilities of learning from action. It also increases the risk of repeating
others’ previous mistakes. Such behaviour limits the potential benefits of knowledge sharing both
on organisational and group level.
Russians as knowledge receivers
Reinforcing the not-invented-here syndrome
In many situations, the receivers may hold back from using knowledge from outsiders.
Resistance towards using knowledge created elsewhere is referred to as the “not-invented-here”
syndrome (NIH) (Katz & Allen 1982). The notion covers a number of reasons for rejecting
knowledge created elsewhere, ranging from a general doubt regarding the reliability of the
knowledge to preference of developing own ideas and knowledge instead of adopting someone
else’s idea. Especially in R&D organisations, external knowledge is often rejected, because it is
much more prestigious to create new knowledge instead of reusing knowledge invented elsewhere.
If the receiver does not trust the quality of the transferred knowledge (e.g. because he does not trust
the source), he will prefer to develop the specific knowledge himself instead of going through a
process of validation of the external knowledge before integrating it into his knowledge pool. The
NIH syndrome might also take the shape of group thinking where a stable group e.g. project group
or management team believes it possesses a monopoly of knowledge of its field and therefore
rejects new ideas from outsiders (Katz & Allen 1982).
At least two factors reinforce the NIH in the Russian organisational context: strong group
affiliation and mistrust towards knowledge possessed by foreigners.
In Russian companies, there are usually long lasting relationships among organisational
members. This makes individuals strongly attached to the group both in terms of formal
membership and emotionally. Obolonsky (1995:18) introduces the idea of the “anti-personal
attitude” at the cost of the group life. As a consequence, Russian organisational members tend to
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the stability and familiarity of the particular group and 2) the organisational order and continuity
which they value and respect highly.
The second factor relates to mistrust towards knowledge possessed by foreigners especially
in terms of its applicability in the Russian context. Both in the two case companies and in the
management education programme mentioned in the methodological section of this paper, we have
heard the following statements expressed by Russians many times:
“This does not work in Russia.”
“It is Russia!”
“This is not allowed by the Russian law.”
“This is interesting but not relevant under the Russian conditions – Russia is different.”
These claims are used in most of the cases as protection mechanisms in the sense that if the
knowledge possessed by foreigners is both true and applicable, the Russians’ existing knowledge
becomes less relevant and valuable. These statements are also associated with risk adverse
behaviour: Russian employees avoid testing the new knowledge and hence, preventing mistakes and
justifying status quo and passivity.
Lack of absorptive capacity
 The notion of absorptive capacity has been introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) to
describe the capacity to utilise new knowledge. The capacity is based on the presence of prior
related knowledge. A systematic empirical study of stickiness of transferring best practice inside the
firm led Szulanski (1996) to the conclusion that barriers to transfer best practice inside the firm is
lower in situations with prepared recipients, an intimate relationship between source and recipient,
norms and processes that supports unlearning of prior knowledge. The Russian recipients do often
not possess the knowledge which would allow them to evaluate the value of the new knowledge.
Consider the following statement from a sales manager in one of the studied companies:
“I will tell you something and you will not believe it. After the Danes came, they changed
the package of the product. Believe it or not, just because of that, our sales has increased…”
(Russian middle manager, company A)
In order to share knowledge without encountering big difficulties, there is a strong need for
contextualising people’s frames in terms of perceptions, points of view, assumptions, beliefs and
projections about the future. Unless their cultural (including professional cultural) embeddedness on
the one hand and their dynamic nature on the other hand are taken seriously, knowledge sharing and
use will be severely restricted.
Problems shared by knowledge transmitters and receivers
Focusing on hierarchical status
Inequality in status among participants can be a strong inhibitor for sharing knowledge
especially from lower levels to higher levels. This barrier is reinforced when the participants draw
on distinct knowledge bases and ways of analysing and assessing information.
Russian managers have difficulties accepting that they can learn from employees from the
lower levels of the organisation. This is well expressed in their resistance and dissatisfaction when
they have to work in a group with people from hierarchically lower levels, for example in the
context of management education and training programmes.
Russian managers and employees place relatively high importance on hierarchy and formal
status. The hierarchical levels are linked through pyramidal connections and forces. No creativity is
required from the hierarchically lower subcultures and top-down, one-way communication makes
these tendencies even stronger. On the basis of a study conducted in the largest Russian textile
factory in 1990 Welsh et al. (1993) found that participative intervention seemed to have a
counterproductive effect on the Russian workers’ performance and that participative efforts threaten
the Russian cultural value of communal work. Another study which examined 159 managers’ views
on managerial trials in the transformation to a free market economy and which was carried out in 25
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was “lack of employee involvement and motivation” (Longenecker & Popovski, 1994: 38). As
concluded by Welsh et al. (1993: 74), “by deliberately holding back, they [Russian workers] could
avoid the frustration of being rejected or ignored. In addition, by not truly participating or giving
meaningful suggestions in front of outsiders, the workers would not put themselves in the position
of expressing problems inhibiting performance, comments they may have feared would be received
as complaints regarding co-workers”.
The data from the two case studies, we have conducted highlight similar tendencies:
“I am at a lower management level. That is why I cannot suggest anything to be changed at
the upper level.” (Russian middle manager, company A)
“People need to know where their position is located and act accordingly. If employees at
lower levels start to intervene with initiatives and suggestions, it can easily become a mess.”
(Russian CEO, company B)
Initiative and ambition have been denigrated in Russia. The system tolerated grey, drab and
conventional people. Disobedient and independently thinking organisational members were
regarded as conflict-prone or anti-social personalities (Michailova 1998). Consequently, openness
was inappropriate and those oriented towards personal achievement were excluded (even
physically) from the system. Features, such as strong centralisation, dominance of formal rules,
one-man authority and no tolerance towards pluralism and diversity constitute a context which does
not invite for sharing ideas, knowledge and information across levels – neither top-down nor
bottom-up.
Communication and physical distance
The communication problems are especially heavy in company A where none of the
Russians spoke English and only one person in the foreign management team spoke Russian at the
time when the Danish company took over the Russian organisation. The diversity of meanings
generated by the same words is a highly significant issue in organisational life. People’s
understandings are not uniform and notions and terms are not used in a vacuum. They involve
different associations in different cultural environments. In that sense, notions themselves might be
viewed as cultural artefacts and language as a means of communication in a particular culture rather
than a universal means of communication. In a context where different cultures interact, the
meaning of the notions is used as a matter of continuous negotiation and change and language is a
guide for classifying reality into perceptional units that make a difference for people in the culture
(Whorf 1956, Terpstra & David 1991). The failure to clarify and negotiate the variety of meanings
causes a great deal of uncertainty in the process of sharing knowledge which, in turn, has a heavy
impact on organisational everyday life.
A related issue is associated with physical distance as another barrier operating against the
sharing of especially the tacit dimensions of knowledge (Leonard & Sensiper 1998). Much
knowledge and particularly tacit knowledge is transferred through body language, demonstrations
of skills and subsequent imitation and correction. Moreover, it is difficult to create the needed
atmosphere of trust between the participants without physical proximity. The product innovation
literature and the bulk part of literature on knowledge management propose that a frequent and
close interaction between two sub-units or individuals facilitates knowledge transfer (references).
The tight coupling of people and sub-units creates a shared understanding or stock of mainly tacit
knowledge, which facilitates the knowledge transfer.
On the other hand, a recent study by Hansen (1999) raises doubts about the general validity
of the value of a close and frequent interaction on efficiency in R&D projects. Based on a empirical
study of 120 new product development activities, he concludes that when the knowledge is highly
complex then strong ties are an advantage whereas weak ties are advantageous when the involved
knowledge is less complex. Hansen (1999) points out that less tight ties are less resource demanding
to establish and maintain than tight ties. Based on that argument, the advantages by having weak
ties may be that they obtain the same knowledge with less search cost that with tight interaction.
Another argument for the advantages of loose interaction is that it increases the diversity in
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knowledge of the participant and thus avoiding group thinking – core rigidities (Leonard 1995).
Bresman et al. (1999) also found that the more tacit form of knowledge is best transferred through
intensive communication, but when knowledge is relatively articulated, it can be made available to
the other party with little regard to personal interaction.
Our findings from the two case companies support partly both lines of argumentation. In
line with Leonard and Sensiper (1998), we observed that the physical proximity is decisive for
establishing trust and shared understanding in the initial stage of co-operation between the Danish
parent company and the Russian subsidiary. In the case of company A, the physical proximity is
perceived by both Russians and Danes to be of decisive importance for the ongoing process of
transferring Danish technological and managerial knowledge, mainly because this is a very new
investment and the co-operation between the two parts is in its initial stage. In the case of company
B, the relevance of the physical proximity for knowledge sharing was gradually declining after, as
expressed by both Danes and Russians working in company B, “a high level of trust and mutual
understanding” was established. After three years of very intensive and tight ties, Danes are not
represented in the day-to-day management of company B in Russia any longer. Additionally, the
knowledge sharing in the company today mainly includes activities that are not based on a highly
complex knowledge. These two features go hand in hand in the case of company B, which is in line
with Hansen’s (1999) conclusions.
However, we tend to disagree with Hansen (1999) regarding the need for investing in
establishing and maintaining tight ties in the beginning of a co-operation in order to be able to
loosen the ties later. In a cross-cultural setting, which Hansen (1999) has not considered explicitly,
knowledge, even less complex knowledge, cannot be shared between the partners from different
cultures without going through a process of establishing tight ties based on mutual trust – especially
not in a Russian-Western organisational context. Accumulating experience in collaborating at
company level over time leads to development of the attachment between partners (Inkpen &
Beamish 1997) and to decreased cultural differences, regardless of their nature or intensity (Meschi
1997) which, in turn, is likely to result in a more meaningful and efficient knowledge sharing.
Conclusion
Sharing knowledge among the members of an organisation is a central activity in today’s
organisations. By sharing knowledge between its members, an organisation avoids redundancy in
the knowledge production, secures diffusion of best practices and enables problem solving by
making relevant personal knowledge available to the problem-solving process regardless where it is
originally obtained and stored in the organisation. However, despite these advantages, sharing
knowledge within organisations is not a simple and straightforward process. One should believe, for
example, that best practices of a high performance unit within an organisation would spread rapidly
to other units with a similar function. However, they often do not which leads to a significant loss of
competitiveness.
This paper took its starting point in the assumption that knowledge sharing activities are
strongly embedded in cultural understanding. Culture and behaviours might be the key drivers or
inhibitors of knowledge sharing. A number of basic problems related to knowledge sharing,
knowledge transmitters and knowledge receivers are reinforced and perpetuated in the Russian
cultural and organisational context.
Specific characteristics of Russians as knowledge transmitters are lack of incentives for
sharing knowledge, departmental way of thinking and acting and fear of admitting mistakes.
Russian managers and employees are eager to accumulate knowledge but strongly resist sharing it.
The single departments in Russian companies are mainly oriented towards their own goals and tasks
without considering the company as a whole. The lack of cross departmental co-operation  is
substituted by intensive interpersonal interaction and networking. Russian employees believe that
they “do not have the right to make mistakes”, which is related to their resistance to reflect upon
and receiving feedback on action.
Reinforcing the NIH and lack of absorptive capacity are part of the portray of Russians as
knowledge receivers. The NIH syndrome is reinforced by Russians’ firm group affiliation and by
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their general mistrust towards the validity and applicability of the knowledge offered by foreigners.
The Russian knowledge recipient do often not possess the knowledge which would allow them to
assess (and appreciate) the value of new external knowledge.
Strong focus on hierarchical status, communication problems and physical distances are
problematic areas shared by both the transmitters and the receivers. Formal status is highly valued
in Russian organisations and at the same time hierarchically differences are an impediment for
knowledge sharing both top-down and bottom-up. Communication difficulties are associated with
the fact that in a cross cultural setting the parts involved have different native languages and often
communicate through a third language. The challenge becomes even greater when, for example, a
Danish investors takes over a Russian company with five hundred employees, none of whom is able
to understand any language but Russian – the case of company A. In a cross cultural setting
physical proximity is decisive for establishing trust and shared understanding in the initial stage of
co-operation and hence knowledge sharing. Even less complex knowledge cannot be shared
between the partners from different cultures without going through a process of establishing tight
ties based on mutual trust – especially not in a Russian-Western organisational context.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to contextualise some of the well-known difficulties in
knowledge sharing on the example of Russian companies with foreign participation. Using
case study data, we argue that the specific features of the Russian organisational culture
reinforce and intensify many of the general problems of knowledge sharing.
